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Miller: Medical Malpractice--Constitutionality of Limits on Liability

MEDICAL MALPRACTICECONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LIMITS ON LIABILITY
In the past few years the problem of medical malpractice has
been discussed almost to exhaustion. Nevertheless, recent developments have added a new element requiring analysis. Several states
have adopted statutes placing ceilings on medical malpractice recoveries.' Such limitations raise serious and difficult constitutional
questions.
An examination of this legislative solution to the medical malpractice problem will be aided by a brief discussion of the dilemma
itself. Medical malpractice has been defined as "the failure upon
the part of a physician or dentist properly to perform the duty
which devolves upon him in his professional relation to his patient,
a failure which results in some injury to the patient."2 The cause
of action is based on a breach of the duty which arises as a matter
of law out of the physician-patient relationship. 3 The action can be

either tortious or contractual,' but the majority of jurisdictions
' IDAHO CODE § 39-4205 (Supp. 1975) ($150,000/$300,000); IND. ANN. STAT. § 169.5-2-2 (Supp. 1975) ($500,000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B) (Cum. Supp.
1976) ($500,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40-11 (Supp. 1975) ($500,000/$1,000,000);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Leg. Bull. 1975) ($200,000 exclusive of death).
2 L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 17 (3d ed. 1956). For case law
definitions of medical malpractice, see Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 213, 85 S.W.
1114, 1119 (1905) ("the bad professional treatment of disease, pregnancy, or bodily
injury, from reprehensible ignorance or carelessness, or with criminal intent," quoting from 22 AM. & ENG. ENc. LAW 798 et seq. (2d ed.); Napier v. Greenzweig, 256
F. 196, 197 (1919) ("treatment by a surgeon or physician in a manner contrary to
accepted rules and with injurious results to the patient," quoting from WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 504, 7 A.2d 338,
342 (1939) ("a negligent or unskilful performance by a physician of the duties which
are devolved and incumbent upon him on account of his relations with his patients,
or of a want of proper care and skill in the performance of a professional act,"
quoting from WHARTON & STiLLE, 3 MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 499 (5th ed.); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 438-39, 21 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1938) ("whether the
defendant, in the performance of his service to plaintiff, either did some particular
thing or things that physicians and surgeons of ordinary skill, care and diligence
would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or failed or omitted
to do some particular thing or things which physicians and surgeons of ordinary
skill, care and diligence would have done under the same or similar circumstances").
L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 17 (3d ed. 1956).
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 247 (1973).
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tend toward viewing malpractice as a tort.' While recognizing that
the action can sound in either tort or contract,' the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has held that a one-year statute of
limitations governs,7 thus applying the predominant tort theory.
One commentator attributed the preference for tort actions to the
fact that the usual physician-patient relationship lacks welldefined contractual obligations,8 and accordingly designated the
law of malpractice as a subdivision of the law of negligence, which
in turn is a main division of the law of torts.9
Although medical malpractice is an old cause of action, 0 only
recently has it become a matter of utmost concern. An alarming
increase in the number of suits has drawn the attention of both the
medical and legal professions and of the public at large. Between
1930 and 1940, malpractice claims rose 1000%." In 1958 the
Journalof the American Medical Association reported that one out
'of every seven of its living members had had a claim filed against
him at one time.'" In the past ten years, the number of malpractice
claims asserted in California has increased approximately 40%,
from 13.5 per 100 physicians in 1965 to 18 per 100 in 1975.11
5 Id. at 248.

' Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 258, 12 S.E. 519, 521 (1890). In Kuhn,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held the cause of action was not
changed from contract to tort when the complaint was amended to delete reference
to "contract to cure." The court stated that assumpsit may be maintained on the
basis of an implied undertaking to exercise skill as a physician as well as on an
express contract to cure. Id. at 257, 12 S.E. at 521. Nevertheless, the court concluded that, even though connected with an implied contract, the action was in
reality "for a tort or wrong resulting in bodily suffering and injury, and would not
survive the death of the party injured . . . and [was] thus limited to one year."
Id. at 260, 12 S.E. at 522.
7 Id. at 260, 12 S.E. at 522.
C. CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING 26 (1962).
Id. at 23-24.
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE iii (1973), quoting from the 1544 Acts of
Henry VIII of England:
[Flor although . . . the . . . craft of surgeons have small cunning, yet
they will take great sums of money, and do little therefor and by reason
thereof, they do oftentimes impair and harm their patients, rather than
do them good.
" C. CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING

21 (1962).

The information was obtained from a 1951 report of the American Medical Association. Id.
11167 J.A.M.A. 227 (1958).
13Waxman, A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIAL 23 (1975), quoting from the Preliminary Report of the Assembly Select Committee of Medical Malpractice. Congress-
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Various factors have been proposed as the reason or reasons
for the phenomenal increase in medical malpractice claims. One
factor is that the general public has become what one critic has
termed "lawsuit-conscious."'" This awareness of one's ability to
bring suit has been reinforced by doctrines making recovery more
certain. One important reason for easier success is the growing use
of res ipsa loquitur in determining claims, 5 a practice one writer
referred to as "judicial socialization." 6 Other factors to which one
can attribute the multiplication of malpractice claims include
adoption of the discovery doctrine,1 7 abrogation of charitable (hospital) immunity," application to physicians of a stricter standard
of care,' 9 and depersonalization of the physician-patient relationship."0 Whether caused by one of these factors or by a combination
of them, medical malpractice has risen to the point that claims are
now being filed at a rate of 18,000 per year. 2'
Along with the frequency of claims, the costs of medical malpractice have spiraled. In California the average recovery per claim
was reported as follows: $5,000 in 1969; $7,500 in 1973; and $12,000
in 1975; with $25,000 as the figure projected for 1980.2 In addition,
man Waxman is the former chairman of the Assembly Health Committee (197374) and the Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice of the California
Legislature.
11B. FICARRA, SURGICAL AND ALLIED MALPRACTICE 55 (1968). See also, C.
CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING 22 (1962).
" C. CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING 62 (1962).
See also, MORRIS, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE 17-37
(1967).
SMORRIS, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE 19 (1967).
, See Knisely, Modern Medico-Legal Trends, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 360, 363 (1964).
See also, D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 267-70 (1973). The discovery doctrine
is the rule that the period under the statute of limitations does not begin until the
patient discovers (or through diligence should have discovered) he has a cause of
action. Id. at 267.
" Knisely, Modern Medico-Legal Trends, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 360, 371 (1964).
' Id. at 362.
Waxman, A Health Care Slide, 11 TmAL 23, 24 (1975).
22 O'Connell, No-fault Insurancefor InjuriesArising from Medical Treatment:
A Proposalfor Effective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21, 25 (1975), quoting from U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE (HEW), REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (1973).
2 Mill. Malpractice Litigation: Are Solutions in Sight? 232 J.A.M.A. 369
(1975). Congressman Waxman reported the figures as $4,500 per claim in northern
California and $5,800 in southern California in 1969 and as $7,000-8,000 "today."
Waxman, A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIAL 23 (1975).
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there has been a geometric progression of awards over $300,000 in
California: three such awards in 1969, nine in 1971, thirteen in
1972, and twenty-four in 1 9 7 3 .2 Consequently, it is not unusual for
a doctor to pay from $5,000 to $12,000 annually in medical mal2
practice insurance premiums.
In response to this "malpractice epidemic, '25 many states
have adopted comprehensive malpractice statutes. 21 While most
acts deal simply with insurance" or with procedural aspects of the
action,'28 several legislatures have placed limits upon amounts recoverable for malpractice. 2 In 1975 Idaho passed a bill referred to
as the Hospital-Medical Liability Act.2 The act provides:
The limit of civil liability for damages of a licensed physician
. . .to or on the account of injury to or death of any one (1)
patient arising out of any treatment or course of treatment shall
be one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) .. .1
The aggregate limit of liability to two or more patients arising out
of one occurrence is set at $300,000.2 Each physician and hospital
is required to carry liability insurance." However, if a physician is
unable to comply with the requirements despite reasonable and
Waxman, A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIL 23 (1975).
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 595
n.16 (1973), quoting from Address by Ellsworth Calhoun, Malpractice Seminar for
Doctors, Miami Beach, Mar. 3, 1972, at 3.
" B. FicARRA, SURGICAL AND ALLIED MALPRACTICE 55 (1968).
26 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.530-.550 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.355
(Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4201 to -4213 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
519.1-.13 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.41-.47 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 111E (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 383.010-.040 (Supp.
1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1-:10 (1974); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 148-a
(McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 681-95 (McKinney Supp. 1975); R.I.
GEN.LAWS ANN. § 7-5.1-8 (Supp. 1975) (for professional service corporation); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-3401 to -3421, 56-4301 to -4315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
1 FLA.STAT. ANN. § 627.355 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 519.1-.13 (1949);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § llE (Supp. 1974); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 681-95 (McKinney
Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.1-8 (Supp. 1975) (for professional service
corporation); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-4301 to -4315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
28 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.530-.550 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1-:10
2

2,

(1974); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW

§ 148-a

(McKinney Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§

23-3401 to -3421 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
" See note 1 supra.
" IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4201 to -4213 (Supp. 1975).
"' IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (Supp. 1975).
32Id.

" IDAHO CODE

§ 39-4206 (Supp. 1975).
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good efforts, the requirements
can be waived without also waiving
34
the recovery limits.

The constitutionality of the Idaho statute was challenged in
Jones v. State Board of Medicine.35 Violations of the injured person's rights of due process, equal protection, and access of courts
were alleged.36 In examining the due process and equal protection
allegations, the court used the two-tier test adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Thompson v. Hagan." The two tests set forth
by the court in Thompson were the strict scrutiny test, applied to
fundamental rights and to suspect classifications, and the restrained standard of review for other areas of the law." The question asked under the restrained review approach is whether the
statutory classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the
statute. 9 Presuming constitutionality, the court in Jones found the
ceiling on liability bore a reasonable relationship to the objective
sought, the availability of liability insurance."0 In regard to the
strict scrutiny test, the court held the legislation "does not fall
within the 'suspect' classification under the various Supreme
Court decisions classifying fundamental rights under the United
States Constitution." 4' Thus, the court in Jones rejected the due
process and equal protection arguments."
With due process and equal protection allegations summarily
dismissed, the constitutionality of the Hospital-Medical Liability
Act was dependent upon compliance with the state constitution.
The court held the limits on liability in violation of Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution, 3 which sets forth the right to
access of courts. This right, provided by many, but not all, of the
state constitutions," mandates that "[c]ourts of justice shall be
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4211, 39-4206 (Supp. 1975).
3 Civil No. 55527 (4th Jud. Dist. Idaho, Sept. 23, 1975). A copy of the memorandum decision was obtained through the courtesy of the Honorable Alfred C.
Hagan, District Judge.
3'

11Id. at 2-3.

3, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974).
11Id. at 21, 523 P.2d at 1367.
3' Id. Using this restrained review standard, the court in Thompson declared
the Idaho guest statute unconstitutional. Id. at 23, 523 P.2d at 1369.
"o Civil No. 55527 (4th Jud. Dist. Idaho, Sept. 23, 1975) at 3.
41 Id.

42 Id.

Id. at 5.
"A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RuNamiEDE:

MAGNA CARTA AND CONsTrruTION-
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open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character, and right and justice shall
45
be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." This
4
guarantee originated from Article 40 of the Magna Carta, which
provided that "[t]o no one will We sell, to none will We deny or
delay, right or justice."47 This ancient right remains vital,48 serving
as "a basic and valuable guaranty that the courts of the state
should be open to all persons who in good faith and upon probable
cause believe they have suffered wrongs."49 The court construed
the provision as affording a "full and complete remedy" for every
injury for which one could recover under the common law." The
Hospital-Medical Liability Act did not allow a full and complete
remedy but rather recovery only to the extent of the imposed limits. Thus, the medical malpractice statute was held unconstitutional under the Idaho Constitution. 5'
The decision in Jones is of special importance in West Vir2
ginia, because a bill entitled Medical Malpractice Insurance Bill
was introduced at the 1976 regular session of the West Virginia
Legislature. One portion of the bill provides that "[t]he total
amount recoverable for any injury or death of a patient may not
exceed five hundred thousand dollars."54 The ceiling is a generous
one, and the objective of dealing with the medical malpractice
problem before it reaches the epidemic stage in West Virginia is a
valid one. However, the West Virginia Constitution contains a
ALISM IN AMERICA, Appendix 0 at 483-85 (1968). Nineteen states provide that "all

courts shall be open," and five more require that the courts shall be "open to every
person." Id. at 484-85. Thirty-seven states provide in one way or another that

justice must be administered "without sale, denial, or delay." Id. at 483-84.
," IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18.
" Civil No. 55527 (4th Jud. Dist. Idaho, Sept. 23, 1975) at 4.
,7A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONAISM IN AMERICA, Appendix A at 388 (1968).
41 Id. at 296-97.
," Will of Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 176, 205 N.W. 1001, 1006 (1925). Keenan held
invalid as against public policy the condition of a will which provided that the
legatee would forfeit his legacy by contesting the will upon probable cause and in

good faith.
Civil No. 55527 (4th Jud. Dist. Idaho, Sept. 23, 1975) at 4.
"

Id. at 5.

52 A copy of the 3d DiscussionDraft of the proposed legislation was obtained
through the courtesy of the West Virginia State Bar.
S.B. 272 (H.B. 1206), 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1976).
54Id.
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right to access of courts clause'- very similar to that of Idaho.
Therefore, upon passage of the proposed legislation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may be presented with the question of its constitutionality. Because the West Virginia court is
obviously not bound by Jones,56 there is no precedent indicating
what decision would be reached.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never before
decided a case directly on point. Although three situations abolishing or limiting liability have been presented in West Virginia, each
is distinguishable from the proposed limitations on medical
malpractice recoveries. 1) The West Virginia court has previously
confronted the access of courts clause with regard to modification
of the common law. In 1969, the common law actions for breach of
promise to marry and alienation of affections were statutorily abolished. When challenged, the legislation was declared constitutional." The access of courts clause of the West Virginia Constitution was held not applicable to the statute because the actions
abrogated dealt with social or personal relations and did not affect
an injury to a person in his "person, property or reputation." 5 2)
Closely analogous to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Bill is the
Wrongful Death Act.6" Under the Wrongful Death Act, liability is
limited to $10,000 for damages deemed "fair and just" and to
$100,000 "for such further damages."'" However, unlike medical
art. 3, § 17:
The courts of this State shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial
or delay.
51The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been specifically authorized to determine the constitutionality of state laws under the West Virginia Constitution. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3; Farley v. State Road Comm'r, 146 W. Va. 22, 32,
119 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1960).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-2a (Cum. Supp. 1975).
" Wallace v. Wallace, 184 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1971) (denial of the right to an
action for alienation of affections by a child against the father's new wife).
5' Id. at 333. Also, see note 5 supra.
goW. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
In every such action the jury may award such damages as they deem fair
and just, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and the amount recovered
"' W. VA. CONST.

shall be distributed to the parties ....

In addition, the jury may award

such further damages, not exceeding the sum of one hundred thousand
dollars, as shall equal the financial or pecuniary loss sustained by the
dependent distributee or distributees of such deceased person ....
61 Id.
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malpractice, there was no common law right of action for damages
from the death of a person by a wrongful act. 2 The Wrongful Death
Act was created by the legislature to provide for support and maintenance of the family of the deceased. 3 Granted by statute, the
cause of action also may be limited by statute. 3) Like the Wrongful Death Act, the workmen's compensation system of West Virginia"4 "is wholly statutory and is not in any way based on the
common law."6" The proceeding is not one for damages for a wrong
done, but to obtain compensation for a loss sustained by reason of
disability. 6 As such, an administrative scheme with fixed figures
for compensation" is constitutionally allowable. In contrast to the
actions restricted by these three statutes,. medical malpractice,
whether tortious or contractual, is an injury to the person for which
there was a cause of action under the common law.
An analysis of several opinions regarding the constitutionality
of various limitations on liability supports the view of the Idaho
court. The constitutionality of a statute restricting the time during
which a tort action against an architect or builder for defects in
design or construction can come into existence 8 has been challenged in several jurisdictions. 9 Although the act is generally con"2Swope v. Keystone Coal and Coke Co., 78 W. Va. 517, 522, 89 S.E. 284, 286
(1916) (father who had abandoned infant son was not entitled to maintain wrongful
death action when the boy was killed while working).
Id. at 523, 89 S.E. at 286.
64 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-1 to -5-6 (1973 Replacement Volume and Cum.
Supp. 1975).
Ferguson v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 366, 371, 163
S.E.2d 465, 468 (1968) (held that as the statute required award to be made to
claimant while living to entitle the widow to receive unpaid balance and as such
condition was not met, the court could not award the widow benefits).
08 Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 210, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941)
(allowed recovery for mental anguish despite lack of physical injury).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (Cum. Supp. 1975), providing classification of
disability benefits.
" See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.120 (1970):
The following actions shall be commenced within five (5) years after
the cause of action accrued:
(14) An action for personal injuries suffered by any person against
the builder of a home or other improvements. This cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue at the time of original occupancy of the improvements which the builder caused to be erected.
1,Note, 27 OKLA. L. Rv.723, 727 (1974). In Illinois, the act was declared
unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause. Skinner v. Anderson,
38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
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sidered constitutional," it was struck down in Kentucky as a violation of the right to access of courts provided by the state's constitution.7 In West Virginia, the attorney general has said an attempt
to regulate liability for automobile accidents would be unconstitutional." In the opinion of the attorney general, a no-fault automobile insurance plan with a pure threshold approach 3 would be
violative of the rights to access of courts and to trial by jury,74 both
rights provided by the West Virginia Constitution.5 In contrast to
the previous examples, the California Supreme Court has held
limitation of liability in libel cases constitutional.7 However, since
the California Constitution does not specifically grant the right to
access of courts, 77 the decision is easily distinguishable. Thus, the
prevalent interpretation of the right to access of courts precludes
restrictions upon liability for actions, such as medical malpractice,
which were maintainable at common law.
If presented the question of whether the legislature can constitutionally limit medical malpractice recoveries, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals will not be bound by precedent. The
court will be guided only by the United States Constitution and
the West Virginia Constitution, the latter document guaranteeing
the right to access of courts.78 Granted, medical malpractice and
its financial consequences are serious problems to which answers
are sorely needed. In the effort to arrest the malpractice epidemic,
however, constitutional rights cannot be compromised. The door
guarding basic constitutional rights must remain closed in order to
ToNote, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 723, 728 (1974).
7,Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973). In Saylor, the statute barred an
action by tenants against the builder for the death of one son and injury to another
when the fireplace collapsed fourteen years after constructed. Id.
" Op. AT'r'y GEN. (Mar. 30, 1973).
, Under a "pure threshold approach," no suit can be instituted if special
damages or out of pocket damages are below a certain amount. Id. at 1.
" "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars exclusive of interest and costs, the right of trial by jury, if required by either
party, shall be preserved. . . ." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 13.
, Op. ATr'y GEN. at 9.
7 Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216
P.2d 825 (1950), appeal dismissed on motion of appellants,340 U.S. 910 (1951).
" A.E. HOWARD, THE
OAD FROm RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONAuSM iNAMERIcA, Appendix 0 at 483-85 (1968). California is not listed among the

states with an access of courts clause. Id.
7' W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
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prevent a gradual erosion of fundamental guarantees on behalf of
expediency.
Taunja Willis Miller
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